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111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Declaratory Judgment action filed by KGF Development, LLC. 
("KGF"), against the City of Ketchum ("City"). 260 First, LLC ("260 First"), intervened 
in the action. In the Complaint, KGF claimed that Ketchum Municipal Ordinance 
("KMO") 1034 was adopted in violation of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") 
and the Historic Preservation Act, and therefore, Ordinance 1034 is void. Some discovery 
occurred, and thereafter, KGF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that 
Ordinance 1034 was void. 
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge for the Fifth Judicial District, in and for 
the County of Blaine, granted summary judgment against KGF. On January 28, 2009, 
judgment was entered in accordance with the Court's Decision. From that Judgment, KGF 
timely appealed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On February 22, 2007, the Ketchum City Council adopted Ordinance 1005. The 
Ordinance allowed for the transfer of development rights (sometimes referred to as 
"TDR's"). KGF appealed the adoption of Ordinance 1005 and sought a declaratory 
judgment that: (1) the ordinance was void for faulty notice; and (2) that the Ordinance 
exceeded the City's authority. That case was Blaine County Case No. CV-07-250.' On 
April 30, 2008, the District Court ruled in that case that Ordinance 1005 was void due to 
the faulty notice. 
' Blaine County Case No. 07-250 was later consolidated with Blaine County Case No. 08-167, an 
administrative appeal and declaratory judgment action contesting the issuance of a building permit under 
Ordinance 1005. 
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In the meantime, on February 19, 2008, the Ketchum City Council adopted 
Ordinance 1034. Ordinance 1034 essentially restated O r d i c e  1005 but cured the 
notice problem. KGF timely filed a declaratory judgment and an administrative appeal 
from the City's adoption of Ordinance 1034. That case was filed as Blaine County Case 
NO. CV 08-233. 
After Case CV 08-233 was filed, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Euclid Avenue 
Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (Idaho), that it was not proper to 
combine declaratory judgment actions with appeals from administrative actions. 
Therefore, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment action in 
Blaine County Case No. CV 08-233 and to its re-filing in this case, Blaine County Case 
NO. CV 08-837. 
On December 12, 2008, KGF filed for summary judgment in this case. Briefs 
were submitted and oral argument was held on January 12, 2009. At the end of oral 
argument, the District Court granted summary judgment against KGF. Judgment was 
entered January 28, 2009. From the judgment, KGF filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 
February 4,2009. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. KGF owns property in City of Ketchum, State of Idaho, more particularly 
described as follows: Units C1 through C12, 2, 4, 6 and 7, of the Copper Ridge 
Condominiums, according to the official plat thereof, recorded as Instrument No. 530070, 
records of Blaine County, Idaho ("Copper Ridge"). The property is located at 271 North 
Washington Ave., Ketchum, Idaho. (R., p. 17, AfJidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, ¶2.) 
2. On December 15, 2005, the Copper Ridge plat was recorded. At the time 
the Copper Ridge building was built, the maximum height for buildings in the City of 
Ketchum was 38 feet. Copper Ridge was built to the maximum height, and is a three- 
story building. (R., p. 18, Afidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, ¶ 3.) 
3. The Copper Ridge building lies on the edge of a bench that overlooks the 
property immediately to the west. (Id., q[4.) Under the existing Ketchum Ordinances at 
the time Copper Ridge was built, the highest a building could have been built on the 
Copper Ridge property without a waiver of the requirements of the Ketchum Municipal 
Code ("KMC") was 38 feet, a three-story building. Id . ;  R., p. 46; Affidavit of Barry 
Luboviski, ¶4.) Furthermore, at the time Copper Ridge was built, there were no buildings 
in Ketchum that were higher than 38 feet, and the City had never permitted a building 
over 38 feet. (Id., '35.) 
4. Therefore, due to Copper Ridge's location on the bench, its building was 
constructed with extensive west facing windows in the penthouses that provided 
unobstructed views of Mt. Baldy. (R., p. 18; Afjdavit of Kevin G. Fortun, 34.) Under the 
existing zoning, and due to the bench, no building could have been built to the west that 
would obstruct those views. (Id.) The views were expected to be and have been a major 
selling point for the Copper Ridge penthouses, which were expected to sell in the 
neighborhood of $3,000,000. (Id.) 
4. In 2006, the "Downtown Ketchum Master Plan" recommended that the 
Historic Preservation Commission be engaged to advise the City of Ketchum on 
preserving historic buildings through the use of transfer of development rights and that 
the city planner take the lead on that effort. (R., p. 211, Exhibit I., Affidavit of Kathleen 
E. Rivers, Exhibit 4, Robrahn Depo. p. 17,l. 21 - p. 20,l. 4; see also R., p. 211; Affidavit 
of Kathleen E. Rivers, Exhibit 3; Cady Depo., Exhibit 3; Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, 
Exhibit C, p. 57.)' 
5. Pursuant to that recommendation, Ketchum Planner, Beth Robrabn, began 
preparing an Ordinance for the transfer of development rights. (R., p. 211, Exhibit 4, 
Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 20,l. 25 - p. 21,l. 8; see also Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 8-12, 
Exhibit 3). Ms. Robrahn stated that the purpose for drafting the Ordinance was for the 
preservation of historic properties in the City of Ketchum. (R., p. 21 1, Affidavit of Beth 
Robrahn, ¶ 8-12; Robrahn Depo.; Tr. p. 33, 1. 6-21; p. 29, 1. 25 - p. 30, 1. 9.) Ms. 
Robrahn stated that the transfer of development rights Ordinance was not drafted to 
protect open space, wildlife or critical areas. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 8- 
12, Tr. p. 33,l. 6 - p. 37,l. 15.) 
6. Ms. Robrahn attended Ketchum Historic Preservation Commission 
meetings, reviewed the "Archeological and Historic Survey Report" (Survey) with the 
Commission, and drafted Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 211, Robrahrz Depo., Tr. p. 24,l. 9 - p. 
29,l. 18; p. 41,l. 13-15; p. 51,l. 6-9; see also, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn Tll-12.) 
7. As part of the Survey, the Commission also identified those properties in 
the City of Ketchum that are either listed on or meet the criteria for listing on the 
The Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, the Deposition of Beth Robrahn, and the two Administrative Records, are 
Exhibits to the Record in this appeal and are itemized in the Exhibit List found at p. 21 1 of the Record. 
Some of the deposition exhibits are duplicative. For example, the Affidavit of Beth Robrahn and the 
Administrative Record in Blaine County Case No. 08-233 are both exhibits to the Deposition of Sandy 
Cady and the Deposition of Beth Robrahn. To avoid duplicating copies of the Robrahn affidavit and the 
two administrative records, the complete transcript and exhibits to the Deposition of Sandy Cady were 
submitted on the Motion for Summary Judgment, while only the transcript of the Deposition of Beth 
Robrahn was submitted with the Motion for Summary Judgment. Also, for clarity here, the citations 
hereafter will be to the Robrahn Deposition Transcript (Robrahn Depo., TI.), to the particular 
administrative Records (which are Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Cady Deposition), and to the Affidavit of Beth 
Robrahn (which is Exhibit 3 to the Cady Deposition.) 
National Register of Historic Places. (R., p. 211, AfJidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit E 
"Archeological and Historic Survey Report," Attachment 4; Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 21,l. 
8. The Historic Preservation Commission recommended criteria for 
designating a site as a Sendimg Site under the Ordinance and identified the properties it 
wanted preserved as Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, AfJidavit of Beth Robrahn, q[12.) In 
evaluating Sending Sites, the Commission looked at a site's historical, architectural, 
educational, and cultural significance. (Id.) 
9. The Historic Preservation Commission's recommendation was to allow 
the owner of property on which a historic building was located to sell their development 
rights as an incentive for preserving the historic building. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 31.1.3-8.) 
10. Ultimately, the Ordinance drafted by Ms. Robrahn designated 40 Sending 
Sites that could be preserved by allowing the property owner to sever the development 
rights from that property and transfer them to any one of 68 Receiving Sites designated in 
the Ordinance. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶14-18, Exhibit L; Robrahn 
Depo., Tr. p. 41, 1. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9.) The Sending Sites were limited to those sites 
where a historic building or heritage site was located. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 
30,l. 24 - p. 31,l. 2.) 
11. The Ordinance drafted by Ms. Robrahn was presented to the PIanning and 
Zoning Commission as Ordinance 1005. Public hearings before the Commission were 
held in Decem6er 2006. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, m14-18; Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 41,l. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9.) The Planning and Zoning Commission recommended 
the adoption of the draft Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 21 1, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 21.) 
12. Thereafter, in January and February 2007, the City Council held public 
hearings on the draft Ordinance. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, ¶ 22.) On 
February 22, 2007, when the City Council ultimately adopted Ordinance 1005, 
approximately half of the recommended Sending Sites were eliminated and the number of 
Receiving Sites was increased. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, m2.5.) 
13. As adopted, Ordinance 1005 was entitled "Transfer of Development 
Rights." It designated 22 sites as Sending Sites and 102 Receiving Sites. (R., p. 211, 
Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, 'j[ 26, and Exhibit L). 
14. The provisions of Ordinance 1005 most relevant to this case included the 
following: 
Only four (4) of the twenty-two (22) designated Sending Sites were either 
listed or met the criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic 
Places. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 39,l. 17-19; p. 43,l. 44 - p. 44, 
1. 22). No other Sending Sites met those criteria. (Id.) 
The method for calculating the square footage of development rights that 
could be sold by the owner of a Sending Site to the owner of a Receiving 
Site was based on the floor area ratio   FAR^) of the Sending Site. (R., p. 
21 1, Afldavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L to affidavit.) Under the existing 
zoning, development in the Community Core District (downtown 
Ketchum) was limited to a FAR of 1.0. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.~.~) To 
encourage the preservation of the Sending Sites, rather than development 
Ordinance 1005 is found in the Record at p, 21 1, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L. However, for 
simplification, citations hereafter will be to Ordinance 1005. 
Floor Area Ratio is arrived at by multiplying the square footage of the Lot times the variable specified 
under the zoning ordinance. 
Ketchum Municipal Code Section 17.64.010 is attached to the Defendant City of Ketchum's Responses to 
Plaintiff's Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions, Response to Request for Production No. 
1 and is found in the Record at p. 21 I, Exhibit 2., Affidavit of Fritz Haemmerle, Exhibit 1 to Affidavit. For 
simplification, citations hereafter will be to the particular Ketchum Municipal Code Section. 
being limited to an FAR of 1.0, the owner of a Sending Site could sell 
development rights of up to a 2.25 FAR to the owner of a Receiving Site. 
(R., p. 211, AfSiavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L.) On the purchase of 
such development rights, the owner of a Receiving Site could build a four- 
story building to a height of 50 feet and further development on the 
Sending Site was limited. (Id.) Receiving Sites that did not purchase 
development rights and all other non-designated properties continued to be 
subject to the existing height limitation of 38 feet (three stories) and an 
FAR of 1.0. (Id.; KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.) 
The Sending and Receiving Sites designated under Ordinance 1005 were 
interspersed throughout downtown Ketchum. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 37, 1. 12-15; AJjdavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L.) Further, there 
were no location limitations on the sale of development rights to 
Receiving Sites. (Id.) Thus, an owner of a Sending Site could sell 
development rights to the owner of a Receiving Site located next door, 
which would result in a four story building located next to a one-story, 
historic property. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 36, 1. 25 - p. 37, 1. 
15; p. 40,l. 8 - 22); AJjdavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L). 
Vacant lots were not eligible to be Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, Robrahn 
Depo., Tr. p. 35,l. 2-7). 
15. Ordinance 1005 was codified in the KMC as Section I, to Title 17, 
Chapter 17.64. 
16. On March 21, 2007, after Ordinance 1005 was adopted, KGF filed a 
Petition for Review and for Declaratory Judgment in Blaine County Case No. CV-07- 
250. Among other things, KGF alleged defective notice in the adoption of Ordinance 
1005. On April 30,2008, the District Court declared Ordinance 1005 to be null and void 
due to defective notice. 
17. While that case was pending, the City redrafted Ordinance 1005 as 
Ordinance 1034. On February 19, 2008, that Ordinance was adopted. (R., p. 211, Cady 
Depo., Exhibit 2, Administrative Record, Blaine County Case No. 08-233, at Tab for City 
Council Meeting, February 19, 2008).~ Ordinance 1034 restated Ordinance 1005 in its 
entirety and made some minor modifications to the Ordinance unrelated to KGF's current 
challenge. (Id.) 
18. Ordinance 1034 is identical to Ordinance 1005 in the following relevant 
particulars: 
Ordinance 1034 restated the exact same Sending Sites and Receiving Sites 
as those designated in Ordinance 1005. ( I d .  See also R., p. 211, Robrahn 
Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p. 39,l. 19; Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit L). 
Just as in Ordinance 1005, the same four (4) Sending Sites in Ordinance 
1034 meet the criteria for inclusion on the NationaI Register of Historic 
Places. (Ordinance 1034; R., p. 21 1, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p. 
39, 1. 19; p. 43, 1. 44 - p. 44, 1. 22). No other Sending Sites meet the 
criteria. (Id.) 
Ordinance 1034 restated the same method as 
Ordinance 1005 for calculating the square footage of development rights 
that can be sold by the owner of a Sending Site to the owner of a 
Receiving Site. (Ordinance 1034, Section 2.I.5). Again, rather than its 
development being limited to a floor area ratio (FAR) of 1.0, the owner of 
a Sending Site can sell up to 2.25 times its development rights to the 
owner of a Receiving Site (Id.) On the purchase of such development 
rights, the owner of a Receiving Site can build a four-story building to a 
height of 50 feet. (Id.; R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 47, 1. 16-20; 
KMC, Section 17.64). Only very limited development can occur 
thereafter on the Sending Site. (Ordinance 1034, Section 2.L6.a.iv.) 
Receiving Sites that do not purchase development rights and all other non- 
designated properties continue to be subject to the existing height 
limitation under the zoning ordinance of 40 feet (three stories) and an FAR 
of 1.0. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.) 
Like Ordinance 1005, a designated Sending Site may transfer development 
rights to any Receiving Site, and the Sending and Receiving Sites are 
dispersed throughout the Community Core District. (R., p. 21 1, Exhibit 2, 
Afidavit of Fritz X. Huemmerle, Exhibit 1 - Defendant City of Ketchum's 
Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production and Requests for 
Admissions, Response to Request for Admission No. 1; see also 
' Ordinance 1034 is found at R., p. 21 1, Cady Depo., Exhibit 2, Administrative Record, Blaine County 
Case No. 08-233, at Tab for City Council Meeting, February 19,2008. However, for simplification, 
citations hereafter will be to Ordinance 1034. 
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Ordinance 1034, Figure 1). Thus, a four-story building could be located 
right next to a one-story, historic property. (Id.) 
Like Ordinance 1005, Ordinance 1034 does not allow the owner of a 
vacant lot to transfer its development rights. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 35,l. 2-7; see also Ordinance 1034, Section 2., I., 5.j.) 
19. The City of Ketchum has not enacted an ordinance establishing a historic 
district pursuant as set forth under LC. $ 67-4607. (R., p. 211, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of 
Fritz X. Haemmerle, Exhibit 1 - Defendant City of Ketchum's Responses to Plaintiff's 
Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions, Response to Request for 
Admission No. 15). 
20. The City of Ketchum has not followed the procedures under I.C. 3 67- 
4607 for designating historic properties. 
21. Prior to the time the District Court ruled that Ordinance 1005 was void, a 
building permit was issued to 260 First LLC ("260 First"), for Lots 5, 6 and 7, Block 38, 
Ketchum Townsite, based upon its plans to construct a four-story, 50-foot-high building 
on the property. (R., p. 46, Affidavit of Barry Luboviski, 94.) The applicant proposed to 
purchase development rights from a Sending Site under Ordinance 1005, and now that 
the Ordinance has been declared void, under Ordinance 1034. (Id.) The application is 
proceeding under Ordinance 1034. (Id.) 
22. The proposed four story, 50-foot-high building is on the property directly 
west of the Copper Ridge property. (Id.) If not for Ordinance 1034,260 First could not 
build a four-story, 50-foot building on its property. (KMC, Section 17.64.010.H.; R., p. 
46, Afidavit of Barry Luboviski, q[4). 
23. As a result of the adoption of Ordinance 1005 and 1034, and 260 First's 
application to develop a 50-foot building, the Copper Ridge building's views of Mt. 
Baldy will be obstructed. (R., p. 18, Affidavit of Kevin G. Fortun, 96.) As a result of 260 
First's proposal, KGF has already lost at least two sales of penthouse units, and has had 
to agree to a $100,000 "hold back" on one sale pending the outcome of this legal action 
as to the validity of Ordinance 1034. (R., p. 19, Id, 7[7.) If the Ordinance 1034 is upheld, 
KGF will lose those funds. (Id.) 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the City's authority to transfer development 
rights. 
1. Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted by Section 67-6515A 
of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA")? 
2. Whether Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted under the Historic 
Preservation Act? 
3. Whether the City of Ketchum has implied authority to adopt Ordinance 1034? 
B. Whether KGF is entitled to attorney's fees and costs? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for summary judgment is as follows: 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed 
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
Idaho 527,529,887 P.2d 1034,1036 (1994). "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that 
the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but 
must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327,48 P.3d 651, 
656 (2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits supporting or opposing the 
motion for summary judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.' " Id. 'The admissibility 
of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be 
answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable 
inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a 
genuine issue for trial." Id. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case." Id. 
Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667 
(2004). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. ORDINANCE 1034 EXCEEDS THE CITY'S AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS. 
There are two Idaho statutes that expressly authorize cities to adopt ordinances for 
the transfer of development rights. Those are Idaho Code 5 67-6515A of the LLUPA, 
and Idaho Code 5 67-4619 of the Historic Preservation Act. 
Determining whether the City of Ketchum had statutory authority to enact 
Ordinance 1034 involves rules of statutory construction and interpretation. Words of the 
statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 
Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822 (2006). A specific statute controls over a more general 
statute when there is any conflict between the two or where the general statute is vague or 
ambiguous. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126, (1993); Hansen v. 
State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464 (Ct.App. 2003). Where the legislature has 
expressly stated one thing it is deemed to have excluded another. Nebeker v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, (1987). Statutes must not be read in a 
manner that renders another statute a nullity. Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tan 
Commission, 108 Idaho 147, 151, 697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). Statutes must not be 
interpreted in isolation but rather "in pari material' if they relate to the same subject. 
Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho, 201,204,46 P.3d 18,21 (2002). 
In this case, applying rules of statutory construction, Ordinance 1034 must be 
declared void because it does not satisfy the requirement of the LLUPA or Historic 
Preservation Act. 
1. Ordinance 1034 was not adopted under the LLUPA TDR provisions. 
The LLUPA grants cities the authority to create development rights by ordinance 
and authorize landowners to transfer such rights to fulfill the goals of the city to 
"preserve open space, protect wildlife habitat and critical areas, and enhance and 
maintain the rural character of lands with contiguity to agricultural lands suitable for 
long-range farming and ranching operations." LC. 9 67-6515~(l)(a).' 
In this case, the City admitted that Ordinance 1034 was not enacted under the 
LLUPA TDR provisions. Rather, the Ordinance was enacted to preserve historic 
buildings (Section 67-4619) under the Historic Preservation Act. Ms. Robrahn stated that 
the purpose for drafting the Ordinance was for the preservation of historic properties in 
the City of Ketchum. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 33,l. 6-21; p. 29,l. 25 - p. 30,l. 
9.) Ms. Robrahn stated that the transfer of development rights Ordinance was not drafted 
to protect open space, wildlife or critical areas. (R., p. 21 1, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 33,l. 6 
- p. 37,l. 15). 
' The legislative history for Section 67-65 15A makes it clear that "the objectives of a TDR program are to 
preserve agricultural land and maintain Idaho's historic rural farming and ranching landscapes, habitat and 
open space." (R., p. 21 1, AfSidavif of Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 1 - Legislative History of Section 67-6515A; 
see e.g. Addendum, at p. 16, Minutes, Local Government and Taxation Committee, March 15, 1999; see 
also Addendum at p. 20, Letter from Idaho Association of Counties Legislative Chairman, dated March 15, 
1999; see also Addendum, at p. 22, Letter from Idaho Association of Counties Executive Director, dated 
March 15, 1999; see also Addendum, p. 17, Jaquet, Idaho Statesman, 3/7/93). 
The concept of transferring development rights began with the "Downtown 
Ketchum Master Plan." It recommended that the Historic Preservation Commission be 
engaged to advise the City of Ketchum on preserving historic buildings through the use 
of transfer of development rights and that the city planner take the lead on that effort. 
(R., p. 211, Affidavit of Beth Robrahn, Exhibit C, p. 57; Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 17,l. 21 - 
p. 20,l. 4). 
Pwsuant to that recommendation, Ketchum Planner, Beth Robrahn, began 
preparing an Ordinance for the transfer of development rights from lots with historic 
buildings to other lots. (R., p. 211, Apdavit of Beth Robrahn, 3 8-12; Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 20, 1. 25 - p. 21, 1. 8). Ms. Robrahn attended Ketchum Historic Preservation 
Commission meetings, reviewed the "Archeological and Historic Survey Report" 
(Survey) with the Commission, and drafted Ordinance 1005. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., 
Tr. p. 24, 1. 9 - p. 29, 1. 18; p. 41, 1. 13-15; p. 51, 1. 6-9; see also, Affidavit of Beth 
Robrahn, 311-12). 
The Historic Preservation Commission recommended criteria for designating a 
site as a Sending Site under the Ordinance and identified the properties it wanted 
preserved as Sending Sites. (R., p. 211, Afidavit of Beth Robrahn, q[12.). In evaluating 
Sending Sites, the Commission looked at a site's historical, architectural, educational, 
and cultural significance. (Id.) 
The Historic Preservation Commission's recommendation was to allow the owner 
of property on which a historic building was located to sell their development rights as an 
incentive for preserving the historic building. (R., p. 211, Robrahn Depo., Tr. p. 31,1.3- 
8). This process led to the enactment of Ordinance 1005. When that Ordinance was 
declared void, Ketchum then adopted a restated version designated as Ordinance 1034. 
The Record is replete with references to the fact that what are being preserved by 
Ordinance 1034 are historic buildings in downtown Ketchum. "The thrust of the 
Commission's recommendation was to allow a historic building property owner to sell 
their development rights as an incentive for preserving their historic building." (R., p. 
211, Caddy Depo., Exhibit 1, Complete Certified Copy of Administrative Record for 
Case No. CV 07-250, at Tab for Council Workshop, November 15,2006, Memorandum 
from Beth Robrahn, Senior Planner to Mayor and City Council, dated November 15, 
2006). "It is the Planning and Zoning Commission's recommendation to prioritize the 
preservation of historic buildings." (R., p. 211, Cady Depo., Exhibit I ,  at Tab for 
Council Meeting, January 16,2007, Staff Report, I. Background, Paragraph 3). 
In sum, the Ordinance was not enacted to and does not protect open space, 
wildlife or critical areas. Therefore, if it is was the City's intent to adopt Ordinance 1034 
under the LLUPA (Section 67-6515A), the adoption under the LLUPA exceeded the 
city's statutory authority. 
2. The Historic Preservation Act applies to the preservation of historic sites; 
however, Ordinance 1034 does not comply with the Act. 
The City's reliance on the Historic Preservation Act to justify Ordinance 1034 
fails because the Ordinance does not comply with the requirements set forth in the Act. 
Idaho Code 5 67-4619 of the Historic Preservation Act is the only section of the 
Act that authorizes the transfer of development rights. That Section is specifically 
entitled "Transfer of Development Rights." Section 67-4619 expressly allows for the 
transfer of development rights only for "designated historic properties." Section 67-4619 
reads: 
Any county or city governing body may establish procedures 
authorizing owners of desianated historic urouerties to transfer 
development rights in such amounts and subject to such conditions as the 
governing body shall determine. For the purposes of this section, 
"development rights" are the rights granted under applicable local law 
respecting the permissible bulk and size of improvements erected thereon. 
(Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code $ 67-4614, expressly entitled "Designation as Historic Property," is 
the only statute in the Act that addresses the designation of "historic properties." That 
Section authorizes a city to "adopt an ordinance designating one or more historic 
properties." Section 67-4614 mandates that "[iln order for any historic property to be 
designated in the ordinance, it must in addition meet tile criteria established for inclusion 
of the property in the national register of historic places." Section 67-4614 reads as 
follows: 
The local governing body of any county or city may adopt an ordinance 
designating one (1) or more historic properties on the following criteria: 
historical, architectural, archeological and cultural significance; suitability 
for preservation or restoration; educational value; cost of acquisition, 
restoration, maintenance, operation or repair; possibilities for adaptive or 
alternative use of the property; appraised value; and the administrative and 
financial responsibility of any person or organization willing to underwrite 
all or a portion of such costs. In order for any historic property to be 
designated in the ordinance, it must in addition meet the criteria 
established for inclusion of the aropertv in the national register of 
historic places. For each designated historic property, the ordinance shall 
require that the waiting period set forth in section 67-4615, Idaho Code, be 
observed prior to its demolition, material alteration, remodeling or 
removal. The ordinance shall also provide for a suitable sign or marker on 
or near the property indicating that the property has been so designated; 
provided however, that nothing in this chapter shall authorize or be 
construed to allow the designation, regulation, conditioning or restriction 
by ordinance or other means of any property or facility owned by the state 
of Idaho. 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, Ordinance 1034 does not satisfy the statutory requirements for 
several reasons. First, the City of Ketchum has not adopted any independent Ordinance 
designating a historic district or historic sites. 
Second, even if the TDR Ordinance could be construed as an Ordinance 
designating historic sites, the Ordinance is still defective because most of the designating 
sending sites do not meet the requirements for being included on the National Register of 
Historic Places. There is no dispute of fact that only four of the 22 designated Sending 
Sites in Ordinance 1034 meet the criteria for inclusion of the property in the National 
Register of Historic Places. (R., p. 211, Rohrahn Depo., Tr. p. 38,l. 15 - p. 39.1. 19; p. 
43,l. 44 - p. 44,l. 22). No other Sending Sites meet the criteria. (Id.) 
While the City could designate these four sites as historic properties and permit 
the transfer of the development rights associated with these properties, Section 67-4619 
does not authorize the transfer of development rights for any property than "designated 
historic properties."8 
Finally, there is no provision in Ordinance 1034 for signing or marking of 
designated historic sites. Again, Section 67-4614 requires that the "ordinance &! also 
provide for a suitable sign or marker on or near the property indicating that the property 
has been so designated." 
Despite the express provisions for designation of TDR sites in the Historic 
Preservation Act, the District Court ruled that Section 67-4612 could provide authority 
The ability of the City to designate these four sites again depends on whether the City adopted a valid 
Ordinance designating the historic sites. In this case, there is no such Ordinance. 
for Ordinance 1034. The District Court's interpretation is wrong because it does not 
comply with the basic rules of statutory construction. Section 67-4612 does not address 
establishing TDR's, and it does no address the designation of "historic properties." 
Again, Section 67-4619 is the only svecific and statute in the Historic 
Preservation Act that authorizes the transfer of development rights for "designated 
historic properties." A specific statute controls over a more general statute when there is 
any conflict between the two or where the general statute is vague or ambiguous. 
Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842,864 P.2d 1126, (1993); Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 
865, 868, 71 P.3d 464 (Ct.App. 2003). Likewise, the only swecific and exwress statute 
addressing the "designation of historic properties" of the Historic Preservation Act is 
Section 67-4614, entitled "Designation as Historic Property," and Section 67-4615, 
entitled "Procedure for designation." 
Section 67-4614 also expressly limits "designation" to those properties that meet 
the criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Given the rules of 
construction, the Court should not ignore the intentional use of the term "designate" in 
Section 67-4619 authorizing the transfer of development rights for "designated historic 
properties." Where the legislature has expressly stated one thing it is deemed to have 
excluded another. Nebeker v. Pipcr Aircrafi Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, 
(1987). 
Furthermore, to interpret Section 67-4612 to authorize cities to permit the transfer 
of development rights to any non-listed property would elevate a vague and general 
statute over a more limited specific one, and otherwise ignore every single rule of 
statutory construction. Since the legislature has adopted a statute, which specifically 
addresses the transfer of development rights with respect to "designated historic 
properties," it controls over Section 67-4612. 
Also, interpreting Section 67-4612 as a separate grant of authority to a city to 
enact a transfer of development rights ordinance with respect to any non-listed property 
not only ignores the plain and specific language of Sections 67-4619 and 67-4614, it 
essentially nullifies them. The broad interpretation suggested by the District Court would 
essentially obliterate and render the entire Act meaningless as any city could, via Section 
67-4612, do whatever it desired in regard to properties with any sort of historic value. 
Statutes must not be read in a manner that renders another statute a nullity. Hecla Mining 
Co, v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 108 Idaho 147, 151, 697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). 
Statutes must not be interpreted in isolation but rather "in pari materia" if they relate to 
the same subject. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho, 201, 204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 
(2002). 
Finally, the legislative history for the Historic Preservation Act shows that Section 
67-4612 was not intended to be a broad grant of authority to transfer development rights 
in addition to the authority to do so under Section 67-4619. (R., p. 211, Affidavit of 
Kathleen Rivers, Exhibit 2.) The title for the Act as presented in House Bill 96, sets forth 
a separate clause referring to each individual statute in the Act in the order they appear in 
the Act. (Id.) The clause referring to Section 67-4612 is called "Providing for special 
restrictions that may be required by local ordinances." (Id.) The section referring to 67- 
4619 is called "Providing for transfer of development right." (Id.) The two sections are 
separate and distinct. 
Also, Section 67-4612 as first drafted included the provision "[sluch ordinances, 
special conditions and restrictions, may include appropriate and reasonable control of the 
use or appearance of adjacent or associated private property within the public view or 
both." (Id.) This language was deleted in the amendments but indicates that the intent of 
that statute had nothing to do with the transfer of development rights. 
Contrary to the interpretation suggested earlier by the District Court, a more 
reasonable way of interpreting Section 67-4612, and one which not only abides by all of 
the rules of statutory construction but is supported by the legislative history, is to 
interpret the statute as allowing cities to enact further restrictions on the use and 
appearance of historic properties that are similar to but not in conflict with those 
conditions and restrictions already enumerated in the Act. The Act restricts what can and 
cannot be done to properties within a historic district and conditions such modifications 
on "certificates of appropriateness." LC. $ 67-4608. It also sets forth conditions on 
changes in use of such properties. LC. $67-4609. 
The Act also restricts repairs and maintenance on properties in historic districts to 
those, which do not involve a change in design, material, color or outer appearance, and 
it, conditions repairs that do involve such changes on certification by the building 
inspector that they are needed for safety reasons. LC. § 67-4611. The Act imposes 
similar restrictions and conditions on designated historic properties. I.C. 8 67-4616. It 
does not strain the rules of construction nor does it do violence to the other statutes to 
interpret Section 67-4612 as allowing cities to impose other similar conditions and 
restrictions on modifications to or demolition of historic properties. Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with the other provisions of the Act and not nullify 
them altogether. 
In short, a reasonable reading of the Act is that it establishes two ways to protect 
historic properties: (1) by way of the creation of a historic district, Section 67-4607; or 
(2) by way of individual designation, Section 67-4614. Individually designated 
properties, which by the statute are limited to those eligible for listing on the National 
Register, are also eligible for the transfer of development rights. LC. $ 67-4619. Cities 
may impose special conditions and restrictions on historic properties as long as they are 
not in conflict with those outlined in the other provisions of the Act. 
As for Ordinance 1034, it authorizes the transfer of development rights for 22 
properties; however, only four of those properties meet the criteria for inclusion on the 
National Register of Historic Places. Ordinance 1034 also does not contain any of the 
mandatory conditions and restrictions required under Section 67-4616 that apply to 
designated historic properties. 
For all of the above reasons, Ordinance 1034 exceeds the authority granted under 
the Historic Preservation Act for establishing TDR's. Therefore, Ordinance 1034 is void. 
3. The City of Ketchum does not have implied authority under its general 
police powers to adopt a TDR ordinance. 
The City's main argument below (in which 260 First joined) was that under its 
police powers, the City could have adopted the TDR Ordinance in spite of specific 
transfer of development right provisions under the LLUPA (LC. $ 67-6515%) or in spite 
of the Historic Preservation Act (LC. 5 67-4601 et. seq.); or alternatively, Ordinance 
1034 is not precluded by existing statutes. (Tr., p. 32). In essence, the City's argument is 
that it could enact any TDR Ordinance it so desired under its police powers. This 
argument conflicts with Idaho precedent and rules of statutory construction. 
The power of municipalities to zone is derived from the State's police power. 
City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 685 P.2d 821 (1984); Art XII, $3, Idaho 
Const. As it relates to a municipality's authority to enact zoning laws, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that the LLUPA has preempted the independent source of authority when 
it comes to zoning. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 617, 661 P.2d 
1214,1216 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Boise City v. Keep the Commandments 
Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 141 P.3d 1123 (2006). 'The LLUPA provides both mandatory 
(LC. $3 67-6503) and exclusive (Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d' Alene, 104 Idaho 615,661 
P.2d 1214 (1983)) procedures for the implementation of planning and zoning." Sprenger, 
Grubb & Assoc., Inc. v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 321, 986 P.2d 343 (1999); see also, 
Associated Tnxpayers of Idaho v. Cenarrusa, 11 1 Idaho 502,725 P.2d 526 (1986). 
Also, the express provisions in the Historic Preservation Act negate a claim that 
the City has implied and separate authority beyond the confines of the Act. Under the 
"purpose" provision of the Historic Preservation Act, it is clear that the legislature 
contemplated the Act to be the sole authority for cities to protect historic properties. 
Section 67-4601 reads as follows: 
Whereas the legislature of this state has determined that the historical, 
archeological, architectural and cultural heritage of the state is among the 
most important environmental assets of the state and furthermore that the 
rapid social and economic development of contemporary society threatens 
to destroy the remaining vestiges of this heritage, it is hereby declared to 
be the gublic policy and in the public interest of this state to engage in 
a comprehensive program of historic preservation, undertaken at all 
levels of the government of this state and its political subdivisions, to 
promote the use and conservation of such property for the education, 
inspiration, pleasure and enrichment of the citizens of this state. It is 
hereby declared to be the purpose of this act to authorize the focal 
governing bodies of this state to engage in a comprehensive program 
of historic preservation. 
(En~phasis added). 
The fact that the express purpose of the Historic Preservation Act was to 
"authorize the local governing bodies of the state to engage in a comprehensive program 
of historic preservation" suggests that prior to the passage of the Act, the cities lacked 
power to engage in historic preservation. To the extent that the Act authorizes cites to 
preserve historic properties also suggests that any historic preservation must be done 
within the provisions of the Act. 
The fact that the City could not have enacted Ordinance 1034 under its own 
independent authority is proven by the fact that the legislature took the affirmative action 
of adopting TDR provisions authorizing TDR Ordinances under the LLUPA (Section 67- 
6515A) and the Historic Preservation Act (Section 67-4619). "Courts must construe a 
statute under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other 
statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint 
Ind. Hwy, 126 Idaho 145, 150,879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). This Court must assume that 
the Legislature knew of existing precedent at the time it passed or amended a statute. 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659,978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Therefore, this Court is 
bound to construe the LLUPA and the Historic Preservation Act, under the assumption 
that the Legislature believed its actions were necessary to empower cities to enact TDR 
statutes. 
Additionally, if in fact the City could have enacted any TDR Ordinance it desired, 
one must query why our own Representative Jaquet, who presumably acts at the behest or 
in the best interests of her constituents, went to the trouble to get Section 67-6515A 
enacted. (R., p. 211, Afidavit of Kathleen E. Rivers, Exhibit 1). 
The City cited four cases below to support its argument that the City has 
independent police power authority to enact the TDR Ordinance: Gumprecht v. City of 
Cocur d' Alene, supra; Envirosafe Sew. of Idaho v. Cty. of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687,735 
P.2d 998 (1987); Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158,610 P.2d 517 (1980); and Benewah Cty. 
Cattlemen's v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs., 105 Idaho 209,668 P.2d 85 (1983). 
Yet, these cases offer no support. Neither Envirosafe, Caesar, nor Benewah Cty. 
deal with the LLUPA or zoning. The cases were about whether particular non-zoning 
ordinances adopted under claimed police powers were preempted by other state statutes. 
In the alternative, the cases cited by the City support KGF. For example, 
Envirosafe involved an attempt to pass an ordinance regulating the disposal of hazardous 
material. The Court ruled that the local ordinance was invalid because State regulation 
implicitly preempted local regulation. Id. 112 Idaho at 690. 
Likewise, Caesar did not involve zoning but rather involved a building code 
provision requiring the installation of handrails in stairwells. In that case, the Court held 
that an attempt by the City of Boise to regulate State building was preempted by State 
law. Id. 101 Idaho at 161. 
Benewah involved an ordinance preventing livestock from running at large. In 
that case, the Court held that the local regulation which prevented livestock from running 
at large was not preempted by State herd district law because "open range" land was 
expressly not covered by State law. Id. 105 Idaho at 213. 
Finally, if the City does have authority to adopt this Ordinance under its implied 
police powers, then presumably that regulation must still comply with the statutory 
requirements of uniformity in zoning required under the LLUPA. Again, "[tlhe LLUPA 
provides both mandatory (LC. $ 67-6503) and exclusive (Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d' 
Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983)) procedures for the implementation of 
planning and zoning." Sprenger, Grubb & Assoc., Inc. v. Hailey, 133 Idaho at 321. 
The LLUPA requires that zoning within each district be uniform. 
Within a zoning district, the governing board shall where appropriate, 
establish standards to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, 
size, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings and 
structures; percentage of lot occupancy, size of courts, yards, and open 
spaces; density of population; and the location and use of buildings and 
structures. All standards shall be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings throughout each district, but the standards in one (1) district 
may differ from those in another district. 
LC. $67-65 11. (Emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court had occasion to consider the uniformity requirement in 
Moerder v. City of Moscow, 78 Idaho 246, 300 P.2d 808 (1956). In that case, the 
ordinance at issue established a setback line that could vary from one block to the next on 
the same street. In other words, the building line could be farther back on one side of the 
street than on the other. 
In reaching its decision that the ordinance violated the uniformity requirement 
because it did "not establish a uniform regulation for each class of buildings within the 
district," the Court stated: 
The application and consequence of this ordinance is a gross 
discrimination, in that it does not bear alike on all persons living within 
the same territory. * * * it affects property differently on adjoining blocks, 
or within the same block or on opposite sides of the street. As Judge Linn 
of the Superior Court states: '* * * Consideration of the section will 
disclose that the line may be further back from the street line on one side 
of the street than on the other, and even on the same side of the street its 
distance from the street line may vary in different squares, its location 
depending wholly on how far back (if at all) a house or houses had already 
been built, and if but one house had been built, its line would seem to 
control all the other lot owners. 
Id. at 250. 
h discussing the challenged ordinance in particular, the Court stated: 
Under the ordinance, setback lines could vary from one block to the next 
on the same street. The building line could be farther back on one side of 
the street than on the other, as in fact it was in the present case. The line 
could even vary from year to year in the same block as additional houses 
were constructed, if the ordinance were upheld. 
Id. 
Here, it cannot be said that Ordinance 1034 applies uniformly throughout the 
Con~munity Core District. The only properties eligible for TDRs are the sites that are 
identified as Receiving and Sending sites, which sites are scattered throughout the 
Community Core District. Furthermore, the properties that have been designated 
Receiving Sites may reach heights of 50 feet while buildings on properties not so 
designated are limited to heights of 40 feet. On Sending properties where development 
rights have been sold, heights may be limited to one story. At the same time, there are 
many lots in the district that are not designated Sending or Receiving sites, so that only 
certain property owners have the opportunity to participate in the TDR program. 
Also, since there are many more Receiving Sites than Sending Sites, not all of the 
designated Receiving Sites can obtain excess development rights. As such, Ordinance 
1034 essentially applies on a first-come, first-serve basis to whoever has the means or 
wherewithal to develop first. Similarly, the control over what Receiving Site properties 
will be eligible to build to four stories is left entirely to the intentions or whims of the 
owners of Sending Sites who can freely decide who to sell to. Sending site owners can 
refuse to sell development rights to particular owners of receiving sites for any reason. 
Finally, there is no limitation in Ordinance 1034 as to how many sites may ultimately be 
permitted as Sending or Receiving sites, further exacerbating the random application of 
the Ordinance. These deficiencies result in a situation where four story-buildings and 
three or fewer story buildings will be permitted in the downtown in a completely non- 
uniform manner. 
There is no question that under Ordinance 1034, building heights will vary from 
one block to the next on the same street. With only certain scattered properties eligible 
for TDRs and with even those further limited by the particular desire of a Sending Site 
owner to sell those development rights, or by the owner of a Receiving Site's desire or 
financial ability to go to four stories, Ordinance 1034 does not bear alike on all persons 
living within the same district and affects property differently on adjoining blocks, or 
within the same block or on opposite sides of the street. As such, assuming arguendo that 
the City could enact Ordinance 1034 outside of the parameters set in Sections 67-6515A 
and 67-4619, Ordinance 1034 violates the uniformity requirement of Section 67-651 1. 
Ln sum, the Idaho Legislature has established an "explicit and express procedures 
to be followed by the governing boards or commissions when considering, enacting and 
amending zoning plans and ordinances authorized municipalities." In this instance, the 
Legislature has granted municipalities authority and a process by which they can enact 
TDR ordinances in limited circumstances, those circumstance being set forth in LC. 5 67- 
6515A and the Historic Preservation Act. Since Ordinance 1034 does not conform to 
either provision, it is void. 
B. KGF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
When a city ignores statutes and rules, and parties contest those actions, the 
prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. See e.g., Fisher v. City of 
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). Where a city has no 
authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Id. 
citing Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Commission, 117 Idaho 949,954, 793 P.2d 181, 
186 (1990). If the city's actions are based upon a reasonable, but erroneous interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute, then attorney fees should not be awarded, but where a city acts 
without authority, it is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Ralph Naylor 
Fanns, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,172 P.3d 1081 (2007). 
In this case, for all the reasons cited above, in adopting Ordinance 1034, 
especially after becoming aware of the problems with its authority to enact the 
predecessor Ordinance 1005, the City acted unreasonably and without a reasonable basis 
in fact and law. Furthermore, in enacting Ordinance 1034 to protect historic sites, the 
City also acted without authority under I.C. $5 67-6515A, 67-4619 and 67-4614. 
Accordingly, KGF is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under I.C. 5 12-117 and I.A.R. 
41. 
VI, CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute about the facts. All that exists is a question of law for this 
Court to determine. The question of law is whether the adoption by the City of 
Ordinance 1034 is authorized by the LLUPA (67-6515A) or the Historic Preservation Act 
(67-4601 et. skq). Since the preservation of historic sites is not within the authority 
granted in the LLUPA, and since Ordinance 1034 does not comply with the express and 
mandatory provisions of the Historic Preservation Act, KGF should be granted judgment 
on its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment as a matter of law. 
Also, the Court should award KGF its attorney fees and costs incurred in these 
actions. 
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